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Self—Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation
ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the set of Pareto efficient tax structures.
The formulation of the problem as one of self—selection not only shows
more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other
problems (such as optimal pricing of a monopolist) which have recently
been the subject of extensive research, but also allow the derivation
of a number of new results. We establish Ci) under fairly weak conditions,
randomization of tax structures is desirable; (ii) if different individuals
are not perfect substitutes for one another, then the general equilibrium
effects ——untilnow largely ignored in the literatures ——ofchanges
in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax
structure;in particular if relative wages of high ability and low ability
individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor, the optimal tax
structureentails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals,
and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals (the
magnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution); (iii) if
individuals differ in their preferences, Pareto efficient taxation may
entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes; while (iv) if wage
income is stochastic, the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100%.
Our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties
of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention
are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic.
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It is now widely recognized that the optimal ihcome tax
problem is one of a number of closely related problems, in
which one agent (a government, a monopolist, a firm) attempts
to differentiate among ("screen") a set of other agents. It
does this by means of a self-selection mechanism; it confronts
individuals with a set of choices, and individuals with different
characteristics (preferences) make different selections from the set.
Their choices thus reveal information about their characteristics.
Although the discrimination may be perfect, it will not in general
be costless; to induce self selection requires structuring the
choice set in such a way that the conventional efficiency conditiOns
(e.g. equating marginal rates of substitution) will not be satisifed.
The problem of the government (the monoplist, the employer, etc.)
is to design "efficient" self—selection mechanisms; to put it some-
what loosely, they seek to structure the choice sets to reveal the
desired information at the minimum cost.
In this paper, we explicitly formulate the optimal tax problem
as one of self—selection. This formulation not only allows us to
see more clearly the similarity between this problem and a numbe
of other problems which have recently been the subject of extensive
research, but it also allows us to generalize the conventional
Financial support from the NSF is gratefully acknowledged.Iam
indebted to F. Allen for helpful comments. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the NBER—CEME Conference on Information
and Game Theory, Northwestern University, October, 1980.—2—
results, enabling us to show clearly that most of the qualitative
properties that have been derived are properties not only of
utilitarian tax structures (of the kind studied, e.g. by Mirrlees
(1971) and Atkinson—Stiglitz (1980)), but of any pareto optimal
tax structure.
Moreover, we are able to provide a new, and we think clearer,
interpretation of the result (Atkinson—Stiglitz (1976)) that, with
an optimal income tax, if the utility function is separable between
leisure and consumption commodities, then there should be no
commodity taxes. For self—selection mechanisms to work, the
individuals must have different indifference curves. We show that
the condition of separability is equivalent to the condition that
the indifference curves (between say commodity 1 and commodity 2)
are identical.
Finally, and perhaps most important, we are able to derive
four new results.
First, in the literature on self—selection, it has been shown
that randomization may serve as an effective screening device
(Stiglitz (1981)). High ability individuals always have the
alternative of working less and enjoying a lower level of
consumption. The tax structure must be designed in such a way
that the high abi1ty individuals are willing to "disclose" their
ability by earning higher incomes. If high ability individuals are
more risk averse than low ability individuals (in a sense to be
defined precisely in the paper), by randomizing the taxes imposed
on low ability individuals, the high—leisure, low consumption—3—
alternative of pretending to be a low ability individual
becomes less attractive. The low ability individuals, if
they are risk averse, obviously are worse off as a result of the
randomization; but the ability to differentiate between high and
low ability more easily may allow us to lower the average tax
rate imposed on the low ability individuals; and under certain
circumstances, we can lower it enough that they are no worse off.
Perhaps more striking, we can show that we can do this at the same
time as raising total revenue. Thus, this analysis extends the
earlier results of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz (1976)
on the desirability of random taxation to show that randomization
may characterize a much less restricted set of tax structures (the
earlier analyses were essentially confined to linear tax structures)
The second major set of new results relate to extending optimal
income taxation to a simple general equilibriummodel.1 Most of the
earlier literature limited itself to analyzing the optimal income
tax under the assumption that individual's relative productivities
were exogenously determined. The individuals were perfect substitutes
for one another. Recently, F. Allen (1980) has shown that such
results may be very misleading. He examined optimal linear income
taxes, in a two class model in which the relative marginal productiv—
ities were endogenous. He showed, in particular that the general
equilibrium effects may be dominant in determining the design of the
tax structure. Indeed, under not implausible conditions, it was even
possible for the optimal tax structure to be regressive, even for a
Rawlsian social welfare objective function.
1After this paper was finished, my attention was called to Section 3
of N. Stern's paper, "Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration,"
where some similar results are derived.—4—
This paper extends his results by considering optimaltax structures
(i.e. we do not restrict ourselves tolinear tax structures) in
the simplest possible general equilibriummodel. We obtain two
important results:
a)The widely discussed property of the optimaltax structure, that
the most able individual faces a zero marginaltax rate, is only true
if all individuals are perfect substitutes;in all other cases,
the highest ability individual should face a negativemarginal tax
rate.
b) The tax which should be imposed onthe less able individual
depends on the elasticity of substitution, whichdetermines the
general equilibrium effects of taxation.
Previous analyses of optimal income tax structures have made
two further restrictive assumptions (besides that all individuals
are perfect substitutes in production) :(a) They have assumed
that the preferences of all individuals are identical; and (b)
They have assumed that income is a deterministic functionof
effort. We do not provide here a general characterization of the
optimal tax structure with heterogenous individuals andstochastic
income. But what we can show, using slight modifications of our
basic two group model, is that either modification necessitates
serious alteration in the optimal tax structure: in one case,
we show that at the upper end, the marginal tax rateis 100% (rather
tha zero, as in the conventional story) while in the other case,
we' show that, at the upper end, the marginal rate is negatives—5—
1. Pareto Efficient Taxation: The Simplest Case
We begin our discussion with the simplest possible model,
in which there are only two individuals, differing in their
ability but having the same utility function (this, as weshall
see, is not critical for most of the results weshall obtain). The
ith individual faces a before tax wage (output perhour) of WI




C =theith individual's consumption
=numberof hours worked by ith individual
(L1 could equally well be interpretedas being effort.) Neither
w nor L are separatelyobservable, but
(2) Y =w1L,ithindividual's income
is observable. The ith individual receives utilityfrom consuming




Hisindifference curve is depicted in Figure 1. Assume now the
government imposes a tax as a function of income
()T.=T(Y
The individua•1's consumption now is his income minus his tax
payments
(1) c=y.-T(Y.)
The individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget
cons tra mt
()maxU1(c.,L.)
st. C < w.L. -T(w.L.)
yielding the first order conditions (assuming differentiability,
etc.)
u./L.
,. 1 1 / I '' .
-
TheLHSisthe individual's gin1 te of substitution. The RHS
is the after-tax marginal return to an extra hour.
The optimal consumption-leisure of the individual before and after
taxes is depicted in Figures la andlb.
In my self- zelection problern, it turns out to be useful
to write the utility function in terms of the observable variables:
Here we assume Y1 and T (and hence C1) are the only observables.
Hence, we write'
()U=u'(c,ri_Ti) ='(C,Y;w1)
For simplicity, we shall often writeU1 (C1,Y1) rather than t11(CiY±;w.).—7—
Even if all individuals have the same utility of consumption
and-leisure functions, their utility of consumption-and-beforetax
incomewill differ. It isclear that individuals of higher ability
have,in Figure 2, flatter indifference curves: theincrease in
consumptionthat is required.for agiven increase in beforetax
income is smaller, Since to obtain the given increasein before
tax income they need to forego much less leisure.
Formulated that way, we can see that income will provide us
with a basis of self-selection: individuals withdifferent
abilities willmake different choices of (c,y) pairs, since they
have different indifference curves.
-
Theproblem of the government concerned with pareto
efficiency is now easily stated. It wishes tomaximize the
utility of say, individual 2, subject to(a) individual 1 having
at least a given level of utility and (b) theconstraint that it
raises a given amount of revenue. It does this byoffering two
(C,Y) packages, one of which will be chosen bythe first group,






(ii) u1(c1,1) > u1(c,Y)
(12) R (Y1-C1)N1 +(Y2-C2)N2
> R, the revenue constrain.t
(where R is government revenue, Ris the revenue requirement,
N1 the nuinberofindividualsof type 1). Notice that this problemL1 L
Individuals Indifference Curve betweenConsumption and Leisure and TheBeforeTax Budget Constraint.
Figure la






















First Best Taxation Fully Revealing
Figure 3b
First Best Taxation Not Fully Revealing: Pareto










isjust the dual to the standard problem of a monopolist
attempting to differentiate among his customers (Stiglitz
1977, 19f31)
There, the problem was to maximize profits (corresponding to R
here), subject to utility constraints on each of the twotypes
of individuals and subject to the self selection constraint. The
Lagrangian which we form to analyze the two problems is identical:




Thefirst order conditions for this problem are straightforward:
A A — l (l4a)---— p——X2- + — IN1=0,








Itieasy to see that, under our assumptionsconcerning the




i.e.only one of the two self—selection constraintsis binding—11—
provided that, with first best taxation,the equilibrium is not
fully revealing.(In the two group case, it is possiblethat the
first best tax structure is fully revealing, asillustrated Ifl
figure 3a.) Moreover, it is also easy to show that > 0 ,the
constraint on the utility level of the low abilityindividuals is
binding.
The "normal" case, on which most of the literaturehas
focused, is that where A1 =0,A2 > 0. With autilitarian
objective function (p =1)and separable utility functions it
can, for instance, be shown thatthis is the only possibility.
(See Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz (1980).) But moregenerally,
the possibility that A3 > 0, A2 =0cannot be ruled out.
2.1 The Optimal Tax Structure *ikh A2 > 0, =0.
Dividing (14d) by (l4c) we immediately see that
- 2 W2








where T(Y) is the tax function. Hence
—}i--





Then (15b) can be rewritten as
i i+2 a =
fromwhich it follows that (Figure 3c) either
2 1 a <a<1
or
1 2 l<a <a.
Since, by assumption,c1 >a2,it therefore follows that
a2 <a1<1,
We immediately see that the marinal tax rate facedy the
less able individual will be positive; it will be greater the smaller
the proportion of low ability individuals there are in the population.-llb-
2.2 The Optimal Tax Structure with =0,A2 >0.
Exactly the same kinds of arguments as used in Section 2.1
can be employed to establish that if =0,X2 >0,the
marginal tax rate faced by the less able individual is zero,
while the marginal tax rate faced by the more able individual
is negative: self—selection requires that they work more than
they would in a non-distortionary situation.(See Figure 3d.)
For the rest of this paper, we focus our attention on th


















3. Desirability of Randomization
In this section we derive conditions under which randomization
of taxes is desirable. As in other sithilar screening (or principal
agent) problems, the objective of randomization is to increase
the effectiveness of screening (or, to put it another way, to
reduce the welfare loss associated with the self—selection constraints.)
It is easy to establish that it is never
desirable to randornize the tax Imposed on the upper income
individual. Randomizing the tax (the after tax income) enjoyed
by the low ability group lowers their welfare, at the same average
tax rate. To leave them at the same level of expected utility, we
must, at each Y ,increasethe mean consumption, as illustrated in
figure 4a .Atthe sane time, the maximum mean consumption we can
provide to the low ability group, for each level of Y,andstill
have the upper ability group choose the point {Y,C}
,israised
by a sufficient amount that the "separating" contract entails a
higher Y and a higher average level of consumption, C1; and it
is possible that C1 has increased by less than Y1, so that the
government revenue is increased.
The derivation of the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the desirability of a small amount of randomization are
straightforward.Cl =l+
Cl =1_





The equilibrium separating contract generating utility levels
2 U and Uto the two groups is defined by the pair of equations
u1(+,Y)+u'(-,Y)
(16a) = 1 1
— +y)+ — t, Y
(16b) U2 = 2
1
Government revenues are
(17) R (Y1 — + (Y2-
c2)N2
Wesimply need to calculate, as we increase ,whether increases



















11n the following discussion, we drop the subscript of










dë1 Y1 dC1f'Y1 dA A dA
.C1
and define and AU as the corresponding derivatives with









































It is immediate that












(27b) =MRS1-1,marginal tax rate on incomes on individual 1 1—T
iU1c1 (27) p = •, measureof relative risk aversion
Thus, the desirability of random taxation depends on three
factors:
(1)the magnitude of the marginal distortion imposed by the
non—random tax (the effective marginal tax rate)- -15a-
•(2)the differences in relative risk aversion
and
-
(3)the differences in the marginal rates of substitution
(the slopes of the indifference curves) in {C ,Y}space)
We have described the conditions under which a particular
(but natural) kind of randomization is desirable:the individual
is told his tax liability only after he has filled in his tax
form; he makes his work decision, of course, beforehe knows
-C
whathis tax will be.
The government could, however, have randomized its tax
schedules prior to the individual undertaking his workdecision.
That is, we allow the individual either to declare thathe is
among the more able, in which case weconfront him iiih a tax
schedule which generates {c,Y} ;orto declare that he is
among the less able, in which casehe will be confronted with,
say, one of two tax schedules, leadingto {c,Y} or
{C*,y* }{C,y,C*,Yt*,C
,Y
}mustbe chosen so that
the more able person has a higher utility i'h {c,Y}than
his expected utility with the random tax scheme.




(28a) U (C1 -n, —p)+U (C1 + h, +p)=U
(28b) U1(C1 -n,Y1 -p)+U1(C1 + h, +p)
Thefirst constraint is the self—selection constraint,the
second assures us thatEU1is not loweredby randomization.-15b-















Differentiating the numerator twice with respect to p,weobtain
at p =0
4( Uil+U]Ufl}
Thus,recalling the definition of U1, provided
U122 U12
121 11
1 randomization is desirable.
For randomization to be desirable, all we require is that there
exists some {p,h,n} satisfying (28) such thatri >h.n and h
do not need to be positive.—15 C—
Wehave thus shown how, under fairly weak conditions,
randomization may enable a weakening of the self—selection
constraints, and therefore an increase in expected utility.
There is a quite different kind of randomization noted in
Stiglitz (1976) where the maximized value of (expected) utility
is observed to be a (locally) convex function of revenue
raised when distortionary taxation is imposed. In that case,
utilitarianism requires randomization (ex post horizontal
inequity). A s±nple example illustrating this, in the present
context, is provided by the family of indifference curves of
Figure 4b .Thishas two critical properties. For each
level of Y(work) ,thereis a saturation level of consumption
C(Y). For {C,Y} smaller.than the critical level, indifference
curves are straight lines; for convenience, we assume theyhave
a slope of .













(It is easy to show, for this problem,that Y1 =0.)Since the
















which can be either positive or negative.1 Thus, rather than
raising ifromthe population in a "uniform" manner, it pays
to divide the population arbitrarily into two groups, raising








1Although in our example, we have let utility be a linear
(rather than strictly concave) function of C and Y, for levels
below saturation, it is clear the result would still obtain provided

















3. Utilitarian Optimal Taxes
The previous sections focused on pareto efficient taxation.
Mjst of •the earlier optimal tax literature assumed a much stronger
objective function: the government wished to maximize autilitari-an
objective function, i.e. in the present context,it
max U1N1 +U2N2
subject to the self selection and revenueconstraints. If we
write down the Lagrangean expression for this problem, itis
identical to (13), with one minor difference: while in (13), we
specified U11and, thelagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint, was one of the variables to be determinedin the
analysis; here it is as if we knew the value of the Lagrange
multiplier = wecan solve for the value of
whichcorresponds to this particular value of the Lagrange
multiplier.With this slight modification, all of the earlier
analysis becomes directly applicable to this problem.—17—
Alternatively, suppose we represent consumers by a monotone
(but not necessarily concave) transform of the utility function U
U (U1)
Then, in the first order conditions describing the optimal tax
structure, wherever we had U ,wenow have and 'U ;similarly
for the second individual. Since 'cantake on any value, it is
clea± that the first order conditions describing pareto efficient
taxation and those that describe utilitarian tax structure for
appropriately specified function are equivalent.
5. Desirability of differentiation. We noted in our introduction
that there was a cost to differentiating among different individuals.
It is not obvious, in the context of say a utilitarian social welfare
function, that it is always desirable to differentiate, or to dif f--
entiate completely if there are many groups. In the general screening
literature, equilibria in which individuals who are different are
treated the same (and in which, as a result, we cannot infer
perfectly the characteristics of the individuals) are referred to
as pooling equilibria (Rothschild-Stiglitz, 1976), and it can be
shown that pooling equilibria can arise in a variety of circumstances
(Stiglitz, 1977). Here, we show (i) if there are two groups, and the
more productive group indifference curves have a flatter slope
in {C, Y} space then differentiation is desirable;
(ii) If more prcccfictive groups have a slope in [c, Y} space,
which at some point,'is the same as that of the less productive
group, then a pooling equilibrium cannot be ruled out;—18—
(iii) if there are three or more groups, then pooling among a
subset may well be desirable;
(iv) if individuals differ in tastes as well as abilities, then
complete differentiation will not, in general, be possible.
To see the first result, we have depicted in figure 5 a
case with two groups of individuals "pooled" together. Any
point in the shaded area generates a separating equilibrium, and
any point along the lower envelope of 1 and 2's indifference
curves separates and leaves the welfare of each group unaffected.
We need to see what happens to government revenue. If
(31a) lay!<1, j2
by offering a point such as A ,we"separate" and we increase
government revenue, since the required increase in 2s consurntpion





apoint such as B separates, and the reduction in consumption -














Thus,there always exists a separating contract which increases
revenue and leaves utilities of all individuals unchanged.The
only pareto efficient tax structures entail separation.
The same argument obviously holds if the less productive
individuals always have flatter indifference curves, but this is
not a particularly plausible assumption.
In figure6 we illustrate what happens if the different
types of individuals have different preferences,such that the
more able 's indifference curve is not always flatterthan the
less ables. The point P is a point of tangency. The shaded
area represents the set ofC, Ypoints which together with
p ,separatethe two groups. But clearly, it is possible that
=1.
Figure 7 illustrates the result that with three or more
groups, partial pooling may bedsirable. Two points are offered,
E1 and E2 ,with chosen by the high ability group, E2 ,
bythetwo low ability groups. The points which separate 2 and 3











which separate 2 and 3 and also separate 1 are only those
which lie between 2 and 3 below l's indifference curve (the
heavily shaded area). Thus if at E
(32a) <
2
clearly, we cannot keep everyone on their same indifference
curves and increase government revenue.
This does not, of course, prove that the {E1, E2} con-
stitutes an efficient tax structure. It may be possible to
raise revenue and increase l's utility level. If( 32a) is
true, it is clear that
(32b)2
<1.
Hence,by offering a new set of points {E ,E}as illustrated
in the figure, we can separate, and increase government revenue
collected from individuals of type 2.At the same time, we
decrease the revenue collected from individuals of the highest
ability (recall, that efficient taxation implies that thereis
no distortionary taxation on the highest ability individual)
and hence as we increase their welfare, we decreasework
and increase consumption; government
revenue collected from him thus must decrease .Whethertotal
revenue collected increases or decreases thus depends onthe
relative number of individuals of the two types.—21--
The same argument obviously holds if we have a continuum
of types. This analysis provides some insights into the results
noted earlier (Nirrlees (1971) ,Stiglitz(1977))that the
optimal tax structure with a continuum of individuals will not,
in general, be differentiable; there may well be "kinks" in
the optimal tax structure, which have the property that individuals
with different marginal rates of substitution obtain exactly
the same income (Figure 8)
Finally, figure 9billustrates a case with 2 ability
groups and 2 taste groups. In each ability group, there are
some individuals who dislike working more than others; their
indifferenCe curves (in {c, )orIc, L} space) are accordingly
steeper. The important characteristic is that in {C, Y} space,
the indifference curves of a high ability lazy worker and a low
ability industrious worker may intersect several times, as illus-











Kinked Optimal Tax Structure
a—22--
Thus
dC dC 1 v' v'
1 dY 2
'
U U 1 2
But




Thus, the higher ability individual could have a greater
aversion to work, but if the elasticity of his marginal aversion
to work function is less than that of the low ability individual,
for high enough income levels, his indifference curve is
flatter than the low ability individual's indifference curve.
At low levels of income, however, his indifference curve is
steeper. This is the case illustrated in the figure 9a
The converse case is also clearly possible.
The result that their indifference curves could intersect
several times (or indeed may completely coincide) should not
be surprising. An individual who has a productivity of k
times another, and an individua.l who receives "disutility"
of work of 1/k times another are indistinguishable on the
basis of their indifference curves in c,Y} space; it is
their indifference curves in {c,} space which provide the
basis of the self—selection mechanism. Note that there may
be other ways of differentiating among these individuals ; forinstance,
these individuals do have different levels of consumption of
leisure. Although we cannot observe their levels of consumption







which are complements of leisure, and use this as a basis
of inferring their ability. We shall examine thispossibility
in greater detail in Section 6
In Figure 9b we show a tax structure with three points,
E1, E2 andE3;the high ability low aversion to work individuals
choose E1; the high ability, high aversion to work individuals
choose the two low ability individuals chooseE3. Note
that there is no point near which separates (i.e. lies
between the two indifference curves) and also lies below the
indifference curve of the high ability—high aversion to work
individual.
This, of course, is not particularly disturbing. One might
want to argue that one does not wish to differentiate between
individuals on the basis of their attitudes towardswork, only
on their ability (but see Section 8below). But now, let us
reinterpret our result: let U2 be the low ability low
aversion to work individual, and U be the high ability high
aversion to work individual.(From our previous calculations
we know tint this is a possible configuration.) Then our
analysis shows that efficient taxation may entail treating
hich ability lazy individuals identically to lowability hard
working individuals.1
Although we have only established the inability to differentiate
locally, it is easy to extend the arguments to show that the
equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Let {CA,YA} and {cB,YB}
represent the two nearest points to which separate. Then
we require A - c3-c <_A
>-
Moreover,if types 3 and 4 are small relative to types 1 and 2,any
movement within the shaded area which improves U2's welfare (and








and subject to the self selection constraints. These require
a little care to write downcorrectly.The government, it must
be recalled, does not observe and .Itonly observes
and .Ifthe wage of the ith group is w ,ifthe first
group has an income of and labor input of L, ,forthe
second group to have the same income as the first group requires
a labor input of
-L1w1
2 w2






Astheratio of L2/L1 increases, w2/w1 decreases O therequired
labor input of L2 ,toobtain the same income onehas, increases.












As before, we can easily show =0,p >0.We
obtain first order conditions analogous to thosederived earlier:
(36a) =p - - YNJ=0
(36b) p_±_—
x2---( —q') +yF1N1 =0
(36c) ___
BC2
(36d) = + -
2
+ 1F2N2 =0










If the two types of labor are not perfectsubstitutes, then the
marginal tax rate on tt most ableindividual should be negative.







________ 1 ) (1—
1+2
where we have made use of the fact that
f ft
9' N1L1 ÷ (22)2 fi N1L1
1)
w2.
where a =theelasticity of substitution.
Since (assuming w1 <w2)
































magnitude of which depends on the e1asticitof.ubstitution.—28—
7.Simultaneous Taxation of Income ax-id Commodities
Our earlier discussion suggested that if not only income,
but also the levels of consumption of various commodities were
observable, that the government might want to base its taxation
on these variables as well. Consumption of luxuries is often
thought to be a better indicator of well-being than reported
income.
This problem can easily be analyzed within our framework.
We now let the individual's utility be a function of a whole





For simplicity, we assume that each of the goods costs one unit
oflabor to produce (this is just a choice of units). The
individual is given a choice of two "packages"; now eachinvolves
a vector of consumption goods and a level of before tax income.
The government must choose these packages to maximize individual
l's utility, subject to inividul 2 obtaining a given level of
utility, and subject to the self section and budget constraints,.,—29—
If we now interpret C as a vector, the Lagrangian for this
problem is identical to that formulated earlier, exceptfor the








wheree is the unit vector, i.e.
R>N1Y1+Y2N2—E(C N ÷C N) iji2j2
If we nowdifferentiatethe Lagrangian with respect to
wc obtain -
(39a) = 2 C. +i?c-
(N1
=0
lj lj lJ lj
U2 tJ2 Ul
(39b) iC2 =0






It is easy to show, as before, that =0:only the second




U/ lk N1Y-X2&12/ 1k
(40a)yields the familiar result that there should be no
distortionary taxation on the individual with the highest ability.
The interpretation of (4Db) LShoweversomewhat more subtle.
Consider •frst the case where individuals have separable utility
functions betenleisureand goods, i.e.










_rad goodsare s ea rable,_thereshould be nocornrnodj
taxation. Iftheyare not, we obtain
44 TJ2 CjCX2Clj&lk)
or
T-"1] -'1i(1 -lk (45)jkaU1/Clk
-
2Cii—31--
2c. . c =______.jr1_ JL-
'lk /1k l+x—---—--—--- j-.
2U1RclJ
Thus, whether commodity j should be taxed or subà sized relative
to k depends on whether the more able individuals marginal rate of
substitution of jfor k exceeds that of the low ability person
or conversely.
Thus the result that, with separability, only an income tax is
needed, which seemed so surprising at first becomes entirely
understandablewithin this frame;ork; if the two groups of individuals
have the same indifference curves. (locally) between two commodities
wecannot use the differential taxation as a basis of
separation; if they differ, we can. By taxing the commodity which
themore able individual values more highly, we make the lower
ability individuals "package" less attractive to him. We thus can
taxthehigher ability individal more heavily without having himtrying
to"disguise" himself as a low ability person.
Earlier, we remarked that, since the analysis of the
discriminating monopolist and of pareto efficient taxation were
formallyidentical, we could borrow results originally obtained in
one area to the other. Here, wenotethat the resultwe have just
obtained has immediate implications for the pricing policy of a
niultiproduct monopolist. If the individual's utility function is
separablein "other goods" and the goods purchased from the
monopolist,then the monopolist shOuld charge relative prices of
the different commodities equal to the marginal production cost—32—
if not, he should tax or subsidize one commodityrelative to a
second depending on whether the individuals who consumemore have
higher or lower marginal rate ofsubstitution between the two
commodities.
It should also be obvious that although we have limited our
attention to the problem of optimal taxation, the analysis of the
optimal pricing of a public utility is precisely the same problem.
The only distinction that arises, at least in some cases, is that
the public utility is allowed to control only a subset of the prices.
If we assume that the other prices are fixed, then we can form a.
Hicksian composite commodity (called "other goods"), and the
determination of the total outlay (charge for the package of
services supplied by the public utility) determines the amount
of the "other good" available to the individual. With these
modificationS, (interpreting "Y" now as "other goods") the earlier
analysis is directly applicable to the problem at hand.
Moreover, if relative prices of the "other goods"are no.t
fixed, then we can modify the analysis of the multi—product case,
in the same way that we earlier modified our analysis of the
single product case, with parallel results: now, even for the
most able individual, we will wish to impose distortionary taxation
(charge distort ionary prices).—33—
8. Pareto Efficient Taxation with Different Tastes
The framework we have developed allows us to obtain some
simple but interesting results on the structureof Pareto
efficient taxation with two or more taste groups. Asin
Section 5 ,weassume that some individuals are more
averse to work than others. For simplicity, we assumethere
are three groups, two high ability types and a singlelow
ability type.
We wish to establish two propositions: First, itis
always Pareto efficient to differentiate on thebasis of
tastes; we should never "pool" the two high ability groups
together. Secondly, Pareto efficient taxationoften will
entail regressivity, i.e. marginal rates which are less than
zero.
To see the first proposition, turn to Figure 10 where
we have assumed that the government offers twocontracts, E1
and E2, with both of the high ability groups at E1. Bythe
same kind of reasoning used earlier, clearly any pointbetween




(or both); hence there exist points which increase government
revenue and leave every individual's utilityunaffected. Indeed,
the efficient set of contracts for this example denoted {E1 E,—34—
andE2}are such that the marginal rate paidby both of the
two upper ability groups are zero. We have drawn through E
a line with a slope of 45°. In the figure, it passes below
E. This implies that the increment in consumption in moving
fromE to E exceeds the increment in income, i.e. the mean
marginal rate over that interval is negative; on average,
there is regressive taxation at the upper end of the distribution.
9. Stochastic Income
This result on the structure of the optimal income tax
should not, however, be taken too seriously', a second modification,
allowing income to be stochastic, leads to just the opposite
result: marginal rates of 100%.
Assume that an individual who works L receives an income of
(w..+A)L
1
with probability .5 and
(w. -A)L
1
with probability .5. Assume, moreover, that he cannot insure
the risk. As before, w and L are unobservable; only income
is observable. The optimal tax structure now requires a
specification of ttwO packages" as before, but the packages
aremorecomplicated. By deciding on a level of effort (L)
the individual is essentially "purchasing" a lottery. The
structure of th tax structure deterrhnes the pay-off S Ofl the







points, denoted {ClL,YlL,C1H,YlH,C2LY2LC2HIY2H} with the
property that (expected) government income is maximized,
subject to the self—selection constraints and subject to the
(expected) utility constraints for each of the twc types. The
problem is thus formally identical to that discussed earlier.
We will, accordingly, not set up the problem, but we
sha11 borrow one result from our earlier analysis: the
"package" offered to the high ability individuals must be
"non—distortionary," i.e. it maximizes the revenue obtained
from him subject to the utility constraint. But if the
individual is risk averse, this implies that he must receive
the same consumption in the two states. But this, in turn,
implies that the marginal tax rate on incomes in excess of
2L (letting individual 2 be the high abilityindividual) is
100%.
Obviously, this two group model is much over simplified;
just as in the conventional optimal income tax problem we
could infer the individual's ability by his income, so too
here; although we hazqe introduced a stochastic element to
his income, we can still infer perfectly the individua1s
ability from his income. More generally, however, we will
not be able to distinguish perfectly a low ability lucky individual
from a high ability unlucky individual. This makes the design
of the optimal tax structure with stochastic income far more
difficult (and more interesting) than the deterministic case
upon which the analysis has thus far focused. But so long as—36—
thereare a finite number of groups (or even acontinuum,
with a finite range) if the probability distributionof
incomes is bounded,the highest incomes observed will always
be received by th c highest ability individuals who are
lucky. Optimal taxation entails 100%taxation at the
margin.
The unreasonableness of this result arises fromthe
assumption that individuals have no control overthe stochastic
elements in their income stream. Such a tax structurewould
have peculiar (and probably undesirable) incentiveeffects
with respect to risk taking.
10. Concluding Coments
This paper has examined the structure of Paretoefficient
taxation. Although we ha.re greatly simplified the standard
treatment, by focusing on the special case wherethere are
only two groups, ehave been able to obtain
considerable insight into the determii.ants of the optimalstructure
of taxation. In particular, we have been able to showthat
assumptions that were previously taken to be merelysimplifying
turn out to play a central role in determining the optimal
structure of taxatipn:
-
(a)if tax rates can be randomized, they should be under
a variety of circumstances
(b)if different individuals are not perfect substitutes
for one another, then the general equilibrium effects
——
untilnow ignored in the literature -—ofchanges
inthe tax structure are dominant in determining—37--
the optimal tax structure; the marginal rate
on the most able individual is always negative;
on the less able individuals it is
positive.
(c) if different individuals have different attitudes
towards leisure, the tax structure, in the upper
tail, may be regressive;
(d) if income is stochastic, the limiting marginal tax
rate may be 100%.
The main qualitative properties of earlier analyses
o f the optimal tax structure are clearly not robust to these
attempts to make the theory more "realistic." On the one
hand, our analysis makes it clear that Uzeis much more to
be done. Until a more general theory is developed, none
of the qualitative results can be accepted as a bai of
policy. On the other hand, the extreme sensitivity of the
results to the changes in the assumptions suggests that
results which are sufficiently clear and robust to form the
basis of policy may weilnot be• obtained; rather the objective
of future research should perhaps be the clarification of
the important dimensions of choice (risk taking, effort, etc.)
affected by the income tax structure and the trade-off s which
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